





Abstract: This chapter begins with the object that has perhaps 
most frequently underwritten collaborative work (including 
our own) between the social sciences and neurosciences: the 
effects of the environment. The chapter thus analyses a series 
of conceptual and methodological developments – in both 
biological and social domains – that have created the ground 
for life scientists and social scientists to begin collaborating 
around the simultaneously cultural and embodied effects of 
living in a particular environment. However, the chapter warns 
against some vitiated accounts of social life that can emerge 
from endeavours like these – and draws on recent research on 
the relationship between city life and mental health to begin 
thinking about how rich, thick and nuanced attention to the 
social can be traced through bioscientific methods.
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In an article discussing the neural effects of the social environment, 
published in 2014 in the leading psychiatric journal Schizophrenia Bulletin, 
Lydia Krabbendam and colleagues pointed to the difficulty of investigat-
ing how city upbringing and minority status affect brain structure and 
function. In lamenting how ‘the role of the social environment has been 
largely neglected in the search for the neural mechanisms underlying 
schizophrenia’, they offered the following explanation:
For one thing, the complexity of social risks may have precluded research-
ers from trying to pin down the neural substrate underlying their effect. In 
addition, social risks have traditionally been the realm of social scientists and 
thus an improbable target for neuroscientists. (Krabbendam, Hooker, and 
Aleman 2014, 248)
Here, Krabbendam and her colleagues remind us of the legacy of a terri-
torial division in which the neural has been handed over to the neurosci-
entists, and the social to the social scientists. This chapter comprises an 
effort to disrupt disciplines’ careful tending of their own epistemological 
spaces, in order to figure out how those interested in understanding the 
tangled relations between the neural and the social – not least those 
whose research is devoted to understanding and intervening upon 
mental ill health and mental disorders – might work profitably together.
Many disciplines and epistemological domains now acknowledge 
that our neurobiology is intimately marked by the social, cultural, and 
environmental circumstances in which our lives take shape. Indeed, a 
range of disciplines and approaches – including, most prominently, 
social neuroscience (Cacioppo 2002), environmental epigenetics (see 
Niewöhner 2015; Pickersgill et al. 2013), and social epidemiology (Krieger 
2001) – have lately emerged, or redefined their already-existing mission, 
in order to trace the multiplicity of ways in which, to use the cliché du 
jour, the social ‘gets under the skin’ (e.g. see Ferraro and Shippee 2009; 
Hertzman and Boyce 2010; Hyman 2009; McEwen 2012). Research foci 
range from interests in the role of socio-economic status in childhood 
neural development (Hertzman and Boyce, 2010), to the way that human 
social interaction becomes visible in brain function, to the role that the 
insults of poverty can play in the development of subsequent patholo-
gies (Galea 2011). These approaches and areas, needless to say, have their 
own complex and contested genealogies, both internally and in relation 
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to one another, as well as important differences in what exactly they 
intend by the ‘social’ or the ‘environment’ (or the ‘social environment’). 
We will not attempt to disaggregate those differences here. What we do 
wish to stress is that a still-emerging, cross-disciplinary consensus on 
the developmental, and indeed ontological, inseparability of biological 
and social life underwrites many of the most compelling ways in which 
social scientists (and, at times, humanities scholars, when they can 
claim some purchase on investigations of the social and the cultural) 
and neuroscientists have learnt to labour together. Indeed, it is precisely 
the growing awareness of the importance of the environment (such is the 
favoured term) and of (social) experience in understanding both psycho-
pathological and so-called ‘normal’ development that pushes the life and 
mind sciences to offer hospitality – if not to social scientists themselves, 
then at least to some of the concepts and phenomena with which they 
typically ply their trade.
Let us look briefly at how some of those invitations are crafted. 
Clinical psychologist Emily Holmes and colleagues, in calling for a 
strengthened ‘mental health science’ that will allow ‘[p]atients, mental-
health-care providers and researchers of all stripes’ to benefit, argue 
that: ‘great strides can and must be made by focusing on concerns that 
are common to fields from psychology, psychiatry and pharmacology to 
genetics and molecular biology, neurology, neuroscience, cognitive and 
social sciences, computer science, and mathematics’ (Holmes, Craske, 
and Graybiel 2014, 288). A recent Nature editorial, which endorsed the 
importance of interdisciplinary research involving the social sciences, 
cautioned that ‘[i]f social, economic and/or cultural factors are not 
included in the framing of the questions’ posed by natural scientists 
working to ‘deliver wonderful solutions to some of the challenges 
facing individuals and societies’, then ‘a great deal of creativity can be 
wasted’ (Nature 2014, 5). Social psychiatrists Stefan Priebe, Tom Burns, 
and Tom Craig, proposing that ‘the future of academic psychiatry may 
be social’, have argued that a ‘social paradigm ... would not ignore the 
neurobiological and psychological dimensions of mental disorders, but 
link them to social phenomena in the patient’s life and in treatment’ 
(Priebe, Burns, and Craig 2013, 320). Such an approach ‘challenges the 
accepted distinction between basic and applied sciences’ (whereby basic 
science discoveries are ‘translated’ into practice) by emphasizing that 
‘basic research on mental disorders as social phenomena would have to 
be conducted in the “real world” ’ (Priebe, Burns, and Craig 2013, 320).
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At the other end of the translational pipeline, Ralph Horwitz and 
colleagues warn that ‘unless clinical, social, and environmental features 
that affect the outcomes of disease’ are incorporated within genomics-
based knowledge, the current approach may be carving a path to 
‘ “depersonalized” medicine’. On Horwitz’s account, there has been the 
neglect of ‘social and behavioral features that have been long disparaged 
as “soft” in measurement (because they often rely on subjective reports 
and physician assessment)’ (Horwitz et al. 2013, 1155, 1156). The answer 
for Horwitz is to combat the atrophy of clinical science – by ensuring 
that physician investigators are not waylaid by ‘quantitative models or 
reductionist science’ so that they can focus on investigating the ‘personal 
attributes of patients and their environments’ (Horwitz et al. 2013, 1156). 
We are in agreement with Horwitz and colleagues. But one strand of 
argument that we wish to maintain in this chapter is that there has been 
no atrophy in the ranks of social scientists and humanities scholars: 
they – we – have long been working to understand the elements that go 
towards making up ‘the complexity of human experience’ that Horwitz 
is rightly convinced lies at the heart of understanding risks for disease as 
well as responses to treatment (Horwitz et al. 2013, 1156).
The social in the neurosciences
If ‘the social’ has never been as separate from the biological sciences as is 
sometimes now claimed, it remains true that there has been a qualitative 
shift, from the direction of the biological sciences, in perceptions of the 
grip that social life is thought to exert on the biology of the body. ‘The 
recognition that most illnesses are the result of a joint contribution from 
both endogenous and exogenous factors’, argue Satoshi Toyokawa and 
colleagues, implies that both psychiatric and non-psychiatric diseases 
are ‘likely to have epigenetic etiologies that may reflect aspects of the 
social environment’ (Toyokawa et al. 2012, 72). In a series of essays on 
what he terms a ‘new social biology’, the sociologist Maurizio Meloni 
roots this shift in a series of technical and conceptual developments 
within the biological sciences – from a renewed interested in altruism 
and forms of the ‘prosocial’ in evolutionary biology, to a realization of 
the force of social influence on the brain, to a consensus, in the wake of 
the completion of the Human Genome Project, that the genome is also 
‘reactive’ to social and cultural influence (Meloni 2014b, 594). What such 
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developments share, for Meloni, is that, in each, ‘the traditional sepa-
ration between the biological and the social has become increasingly 
difficult to define: biology has become porous to social and even cultural 
signals to an unprecedented extent’ (Meloni 2014b, 594).
Let us zoom in on the relationship that especially interests us here – 
that between the social and the neurological. The neuroscientists John 
Cacioppo and Gary Berntson, in their programmatic 1992 paper in 
American Psychologist, which proposed a ‘multi-level analysis’ of neuro-
social interaction as their contribution to the then new American decla-
ration of the ‘Decade of the Brain’, drew on the work of philosopher and 
psychologist William James to point out that ‘the brain does not exist 
in isolation but rather is a fundamental but interacting component of a 
developing or ageing individual who is a mere actor in a larger theatre of 
life’ (Cacioppo and Berntson 1992, 1020). For Cacioppo and Berntson, 
not only was this a realization that social processes are underwritten by 
neurological events, but that, in its turn, and crucially, social life folded 
back on the development and expression of individual neurobiology. 
They developed this perspective into a multiple and reciprocal deter-
minism to insist that the promise of the Decade of the Brain would be 
realized only if we start to understand the ways in which ‘the brain is a 
single, pivotal moment of an undeniably social species’ (Cacioppo and 
Berntson 1992, 1027; see also Cacioppo et al. 2014 for specific reflections 
on psychiatry). There has not been a smooth passage from this generous 
proposal to an unproblematically reciprocal relationship between the 
neuroscientific and social sciences in the study of such events. It is worth 
noting, in this respect, that Cacioppo and colleagues, in a follow-up 
article in 2014 that described the potential contributions of social neuro-
science to psychiatry, reported that:
To investigate the mutual influence of the biological and social environments 
and the mechanisms through which these influences operate, social neurosci-
entists, ranging from physicists to psychologists, epidemiologists to psychia-
trists, philosophers to neurobiologists, and entomologists to zoologists, have 
begun to work together in interdisciplinary scientific teams using animal 
models, patient studies, and research on healthy individuals. (Cacioppo et al. 
2014, 132)
That sociologists (or anthropologists, or geographers) are not picked 
out in this list is striking. It suggests the need for research to account 
for why interdisciplinary collaborations between neuroscientists and 
(particular kinds of) social scientists appear to have been harder to 
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get off the ground than collaborations with, say, entomologists. We 
might nonetheless claim that Cacioppo and Berntson set the stage for 
a contemporary research landscape that – at least in certain corners – is 
attending carefully to the ways in which social adversity is a causal factor 
in mental disorder (European Network of National Networks studying 
Gene-Environment Interactions in Schizophrenia (EU-GEI) et al. 2014; 
Hyman 2009), in which the sociopolitics of stress and trauma are situ-
ated in accounts of specific psychopathologies (Galea 2011), in which 
specific brain regions are situated vis-à-vis the role they play in human 
social interaction (Amodio and Frith 2006), and so on.
From the other direction, a range of positions in social theory have 
radically undercut the traditional scepticism that the social sciences 
(at least the qualitative social sciences) have displayed toward not only 
biological explanations – but any admixture of the biological and social 
per se. In his account of what might become of ‘The Human Sciences 
in a Biological Age’, sociologist Nikolas Rose points out that, ‘No longer 
are social theories thought progressive by virtue of their distance from 
the biological. Indeed the reverse assumption is common – it seems 
that ‘constructivism’ is passé, the linguistic turn has reached a dead end 
and a rhetoric of materiality is almost obligatory’ (Rose 2013, 4). While 
retaining some critical distance from these obligations, Rose nonethe-
less casts a future for the social sciences in which an attention to vitality 
(understood not only as a philosophical commitment, but as a deep, 
abiding and collaborative attention to the biological stakes of human 
life) returns to the centre of the sociological enterprise. Similar claims 
have been made across a range of contemporary social theories (e.g. 
Braidotti 2010; Greco 2005; Grosz 2004). In our own efforts to think 
with and through bodies, we have been especially moved by arguments 
emerging from feminist science studies, and from that literature some-
times inadequately gathered together under the rubric of a ‘material 
feminism’ – which has, at least since Donna Haraway first drew attention 
to the theoretical potency of the body positioned scientifically (Haraway 
1985), pioneered such approaches. Put very broadly, a ‘material feminism’ 
moves beyond an insistence on the construction of gendered bodies to 
ask whether feminist theory might, rather, seek resources in the materi-
ality of the body, and in the thinking of the sciences that labour to bring 
that materiality into understanding. It describes a move of feminist 
theory beyond the ‘textual, linguistic and discursive’, to refocus on the 
pains and pleasures of embodiment: ‘we need a way to talk about these 
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bodies’, Alaimo and Hekman point out, ‘and the materiality they inhabit’ 
(Alaimo and Hekman 2008, 3–4).
We have written elsewhere (Fitzgerald and Callard 2015) on the 
indebtedness of our own approach to Elizabeth Wilson’s threading of 
neurology through feminist theory (Wilson 2004, 2011a, 2011b), and to 
Karen Barad’s recasting of the relationship between political and physi-
cal worlds (2007, 2008, 2011). Our immersion in these literatures has 
led us to challenge accounts and organizational structures that separate 
the practices and objects of the sciences (including the clinical sciences) 
from the practices and objects of social scientific and humanistic inquir-
ies – accounts and structures that we have found to be common across 
the landscapes of interdisciplinary research focused on the mind and 
brain. We are quite convinced by Barad’s account that ‘even when the 
focus is restricted to the materiality of “human” bodies’:
there are ‘natural,’ not merely ‘social,’ forces that matter. Indeed, there is a 
host of material-discursive forces – including ones that get labeled ‘social,’ 
‘cultural,’ ‘psychic,’ ‘economic,’ ‘natural,’ ‘physical,’ ‘biological,’ ‘geopolitical,’ 
and ‘geological’ – that may be important to particular (entangled) processes 
of materialization. If we follow disciplinary habits of tracing disciplinary-
defined causes through to the corresponding disciplinary-defined effects, we 
will miss all the crucial intra-actions among these forces that fly in the face of 
any specific set of disciplinary concerns. (Barad 2008, 128)
In short, if there is now an invitation to ‘the social’ from (some) parts 
of the biological sciences, then there is simultaneously an openness to 
think biologically from (some) parts of contemporary social theory. And 
if such moves are often partial and contested, they nonetheless form a 
gap into which the researcher interested in interdisciplinary experimen-
tation might insert herself.
Accounting for the social
We are pitching for a grant about mind-wandering. It involves two social 
scientists (us) as well as a neuroscientist and a psychologist. At the heart of 
our bid are interdisciplinary experiments on mind-wandering, based on a 
workshop that will draw on accounts of distraction and daydreaming from the 
humanities and social sciences, as well as a reflexive ethnographic analysis of 
what that interdisciplinary process is actually like. Our collaborators have put 
together some excellent slides visualizing the state of the art in neuroscientific 
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and psychological  mind-wandering research. Des – struggling to illustrate what, 
exactly, an ethnographic analysis involves, and aware that he is handling this 
part of the pitch – talks to a slide featuring a photograph by Franz Boas of a 
man wearing a Kwakiutl whale-mask. We’re all ready, after the presentation, 
to justify to the grant panel what, exactly, the hell this is doing there. But the 
questions from the panel, when they come, are almost exclusively about the 
imaging experiments we’ve proposed, and are directed squarely at our natural 
science collaborators, concerning the intricacies of our methods, the solidity of 
our conceptual underpinnings, and so on. The ethnographic portion of the project 
(which makes up the bulk of one of the two work-packages, i.e., more or less half 
the programme of research), is largely unremarked upon.
Afterwards, one of our collaborators wonders what it means when there is so much 
attention to what the experimenter will do, while the person whose presentation is 
centred on an image of a man in a whale-mask has something of an easier ride.
Our scientific collaborator diagnosed the situation, we believe, with 
great acuity. Here, we understand him to have been drawing our atten-
tion to the fact that while the funding panel was profoundly interested 
(and very well versed) in the nuances, specificities, and problematics of 
the novel experimental design that he proposed, there was no evidence 
of an equivalent focus on ‘the social’ or ‘social relations’, still less on the 
variable methods and attentions through which those phenomena, in 
their turn, might be brought to light. There was clearly room for the 
social to be brought into this space (and we do not diminish, on the part 
of the funding panel, the boldness and value of that move alone), and 
yet, beyond that generosity, there was still little scope to account for its 
specificities – or, indeed, to grapple critically with its own problematics, 
erasures, lacunae, and so on. The space was open to the social, certainly, 
but, for the two of us, at least, we had little sense that ‘the social’ itself 
might represent an important epistemological opening.
If an increasing attention to the social environment in the biological 
sciences can be read as an invitation to people in the social sciences, 
what ‘the social’ actually is in such spaces is often rather different from 
what it is within the social sciences themselves. This need not, of course, 
be a problem in itself: there are many models of the ‘social’, as well as of 
the ‘neural’, the ‘cognitive’, the ‘affective’, the ‘cultural’ (and so on) that 
course within and across a number of disciplines; such differences can 
themselves be revelatory to those exposed to them, and can precipitate 
new kinds of research questions as well as methodologies. What perturbs 
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interpretive social scientists is when neuroscientific accounts and opera-
tionalizations of the social recapitulate ideas about culture and society 
that have long been repudiated – for epistemological, ontological, and 
political reasons – from many parts of the social sciences themselves.
Needless to say, there are analogous instances in which social scientists 
and humanities scholars employ outmoded or problematic or radically 
simplified concepts from the neurosciences – either to work with or to 
employ in severe critique of the science. We need think only of the way 
in which such concepts as ‘mirror neurons’ and ‘plasticity’ have been 
wielded outside of their home domains. Nonetheless, we well remember 
the interdisciplinary meeting in which the only other presentation, apart 
from our own, that attempted seriously to engage an account of social and 
cultural specificity did so by mobilizing the social-psychological bifurca-
tion between ‘individualist’ and ‘collectivist’ cultures, which unproblem-
atically split the Occidental from the Oriental (see Oyserman, Coon, 
and Kemmelmeier 2002 for a detailed critical review of this literature, 
from a psychological perspective). Certainly, some important notion of 
culture was at stake in this interdisciplinary proposal – and yet few soci-
ologists, geographers, or anthropologists, and far from all psychologists 
and neuroscientists, would defend the notion of a ‘Western’ culture as a 
thing characterized by its members’ ‘individualism’, whether by refusing 
to countenance that ‘culture’ is a thing (Mitchell 1995), by rejecting any 
isomorphism of space, place, and culture (Gupta and Ferguson 1992), 
or by critiquing any simple bifurcation between two kinds of people 
(individualist/collectivist) (Omi 2012). A number of other concepts 
that frequently surface in social and cultural neuroscience carry simi-
lar difficulties. Andreas Heinz and colleagues, for example, lament the 
‘increasing use of the “race” concept in contemporary genetic, psychiat-
ric, neuroscience as well as social studies’ (Heinz et al. 2014, 1) – arguing 
that both this concept and, indeed, that of ‘culture’ (which they argue is 
often used as a proxy for ‘race’) carry within them the legacy of colonial 
attempts to categorize ‘races’ on the grounds of distinct physiognomies 
(see also the argument by the biologist William Klitz [2014]).
The point is that the roots of perspectives such as these on ‘cultures’ 
and ‘races’ lie not in accounts of society and culture as they have been 
opened up in disciplines such as sociology or cultural anthropology (at 
least in their more recent iterations), but rather in accounts of ‘culture’ 
that dominate the fields of cultural psychology and cultural neuro-
science. In a well-cited review of cultural neuroscience, Joan Chiao, 
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while tipping her hat to anthropologists such as Franz Boas and Margaret 
Mead, nonetheless figures what she calls ‘culture–biology interactions’ 
squarely within an account of ‘culture’ drawn from the narrower binaries 
that dominate cultural biology, viz. a literature that bifurcates ‘cultures’ 
along axes of ‘individualism–collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, power 
distance, long-term/short-term orientation, and masculinity/femininity’ 
(Chiao 2009, 288, 291; italics in original). Such binaries risk render-
ing static and inflexible apparent ‘traits’ that are seen to characterize 
particular groups of people (‘cultures’, ‘races’, ‘genders’) (see the critique 
by Martínez Mateo et al. 2012). What gets – or can get – neurologically 
accounted for, as aspects of the social environment, is here already 
radically constrained, and constrained precisely because it has not set 
foot outside the bounds of a particular kind of psychological thought. 
‘Psychology as a hub science’, Chiao concludes her review, ‘stands in a 
natural position to merge the scientific study of culture and biology by 
harnessing theories and methods from every area of psychology, from 
evolutionary and cognitive to cultural and developmental’ (Chiao 2009, 
300); such a perimeter seems to cut from consideration all those other 
disciplinary locations in which both culture and biology have been the 
focus of intense conceptual and empirical investigation.
As Svenja Matusall and her colleagues remind us, the specific form 
of ‘the social’ on offer in ‘social neuroscience’ can be rather a dispiriting 
one: ‘currently, in neuroscience’, they point out, ‘the concept of “social” 
is a relatively static factor in experimentation ... The approach towards 
studying the social via communal genetic make-up or individuals’ brains 
is rather different from studying the external conditions for a social struc-
ture’ (Matusall, Kaufmann, and Christen 2011, 14–15). In other words, 
there is a big difference between an experiment that differentiates (social) 
groups purely on account of their different physiological attributes, and 
one that explores how those differences might be produced through 
social as well as physiological patternings and dynamics. One might 
make, here, a lament – and others have done so – about the violence 
that fields crossing the neuroscientific with the social/environmental can 
sometimes inflict upon the hard-wrought claims of culture and society 
(e.g. Leys 2011). Indeed, one might well claim that not only is there not 
an especially enticing invitation to social scientists, from a neuroscientific 
field that imagines itself ‘social’ or ‘cultural’ – but that, worse, such fields, 
through powerfully reductive methodological and conceptual strategies, 
inflict significant damage on those very concepts.
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If we sometimes find ourselves in sympathy with such arguments, still 
we are loathe to wave yet another scrawny sociological fist in the general 
direction of the social neurosciences. What we have tried to do, instead, 
through the projects that we have been involved in, is to take seriously 
the question of which accounts of the social are on offer in the interdis-
ciplinary neurosciences today (cf. Young 2011, 2012) – and to think, at 
the same time, about the value that might be placed on broader, livelier 
ways of working and thinking this notion. In this sense, we are trying 
to work through strategies through which more compelling accounts of 
the environment, of society, of culture, of milieu (to use the technical 
term of Goldstein 1995 [1934]) might yet get pulled through laboratory-
based neurobiological studies. Because, as Svenja Matusall also reminds 
us, we can trace rather different accounts of the ‘social’ even within the 
relatively small world of social neuroscience – which is to say, this field 
is itself contested in various ways (Matusall 2013). The tension between 
the rather open account of the ‘social’ that appears in Cacioppo and 
Berntson, and the thinner, more vitiated descendant of that account that 
we read in much subsequent psychological work is sobering. The ques-
tion, then, becomes: through which methods, strategies, and concepts, 
through which forms of alliance, and in relation to which research 
questions might these thicker and more capacious accounts of social 
life be mobilized and operationalized? To the extent that ‘the social’ or 
‘the cultural’ is a way in to at least some forms of interdisciplinarity, how 
do you – whatever discipline you come from – get involved in projects 
where invigorating ways of conjuring one or both are centrally at stake?
The urban brain
One of the – many – uncomfortable facts about collaboration is that some 
kind of strategic reduction (of one’s own concepts and immediate intel-
lectual ambitions) is often the price of entry. One of our core messages 
is that learning to become an interdisciplinarian means coming to terms 
with that price. We would suggest, entirely seriously, and without preju-
dice, that any social scientist who is committed to writing 12,000-word 
papers on different genealogies of ‘the social’, or who doesn’t think she 
could bear the epistemic violence of using a construct like ‘SES’ (socio-
economic status) as a proxy for dense inter-lacings of class, social posi-
tion, and education, is probably as well off not moving much beyond her 
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sociology or anthropology department. By the same token, any neuro-
scientist who is unwilling to look beyond standard social-psychological 
literatures for accounts of ‘culture’ are equally advised to stay within (or 
accept that she is already staying within) the secure boundaries of a well-
established, and singular, paradigm.
With that allowed, the mundane fact is that there are interdisciplinary 
projects where better and worse accounts and operationalizations of the 
social and of the cultural are on offer. One place to which we have turned 
for inspiration is the group of interdisciplinary researchers from the 
neurosciences and social sciences who are putting pressure on how sex 
and gender are conceptualized and operationalized in neuroscientific 
research (for a broad review, see Schmitz and Höppner 2014b). Anelis 
Kaiser and colleagues, for example, in a careful review of sex/gender 
differences that have been detected using fMRI, have demonstrated that 
focusing on sex/gender as a variable leads irrevocably to the detection 
of differences rather than similarities (Kaiser et al. 2009) – and have 
reflected on the epistemological and political implications of emphasiz-
ing such gender differences. Others have challenged core psychological 
constructs used within social and cultural neuroscience – see for exam-
ple Daphna Joel and colleagues’ study that challenged the category of 
‘core gender identity’, which is frequently employed in neuroscientific 
studies (Joel et al. 2014). Or consider the work of those critical 
neuroscientists such as Suparna Choudhury, Lawrence Kirmayer, and 
Rebecca Seligman, who have mobilized the resources of anthropology 
and transcultural psychiatry alongside those of cognitive neuroscience 
to develop and operationalize less enervating accounts of the ‘cultural’ 
(Choudhury 2010; Seligman and Brown 2010; Seligman, Choudhury, 
and Kirmayer forthcoming; Seligman and Kirmayer 2008). Seligman 
and Brown, for example, have drawn on anthropological evidence to 
show that dissociative states are not only ‘pseudo-adaptive’ responses 
to stress, as they are frequently imagined in Euro-American psychiatric 
literatures, but can also be willingly inhabited, bringing to the fore 
‘forms of consciousness that allow individuals to enact alternative selves’ 
(Seligman and Brown 2010, 134). This anthropologically influenced 
account of dissociation, moreover, can be used to parse neuroscientific 
data on the relationship between such dissociative states and inhibitory 
mechanisms, thus showing how anthropological evidence might be 
used to expand, torque and complicate neuropsychiatric data – without 
losing its specificity or force.
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We conclude this chapter by describing a project, whose contours we 
know particularly well, in which one relatively capacious account of the 
social is in play. The genesis of this project lay in three social scientists 
(Nikolas Rose, Ilina Singh, and DF) thinking through the long and 
tangled literature on the history of mental disorder in cities – focusing 
in particular on how the relations between the social and biological 
get recast in a range of different areas (see Fitzgerald, Rose, and Singh 
forthcoming, which provides a formal account of the thinking behind 
this project; cf. Singh 2012; Rose 2013). At the outset of this project, these 
three collaborators were each, in different ways, fascinated by a series of 
papers that had recently come out of the laboratory of the German neuro-
scientist and psychiatrist Andreas Meyer-Lindenberg – which purported 
to show, for the first time, and using brain-imaging methods, a biological 
mechanism through which the stress of urban life could be translated 
into a clinical pathology (Lederbogen et al. 2011; Meyer-Lindenberg and 
Tost 2012). City living has been associated with mental illness for at least 
a century: since the very emergence of psychiatric epidemiology (indeed, 
this is in some ways the founding insight of psychiatric epidemiology), 
we have known that mental illness associates with city life (Lewis and 
Booth 1994). And yet, despite a long and deep research literature, and 
despite the consistency of this finding, no one really knows why this is. 
There is no scholarly consensus around the classic debate between social 
causation (city living makes people mentally ill) and social drift (people 
who are already mentally ill tend to end up in cities for various reasons), 
while a long-standing literature on the ‘social determinants’ of urban 
mental illness has morphed into attention being given to the neurobio-
logical and epigenetic mechanisms through which the tumult of city life 
gets into the skull.
Here, then, an interdisciplinary problem-space begins to emerge. 
Because not only is the relationship between urban space and mental 
health a well-known research area in epidemiology and social psychiatry: 
it also has a rich – but less storied – history in sociology too. Indeed, the 
question of the metropolis and mental life has classical antecedents in 
sociology (Simmel 2002 [1903]), while the question of ‘mental disorders 
in urban areas’ comprised one of the foundational research questions 
of American sociology (Faris and Dunham 1939). But what is more 
remarkable is this attention, and this link, to the biological and psychi-




The ‘urban brain lab’ was developed at King’s College London to work 
creatively with those heterogeneous and overlapping histories. Specifically, 
and precisely with a view to bring a simultaneously social and biological 
attention to the problem of urban mental health, the lab worked to assem-
ble sociologists, neuroscientists, psychiatrists, epidemiologists, anthro-
pologists, geographers, historians, and others around the question of 
urban mental illness – in order to develop novel conceptual and empirical 
projects. Distinct from much interdisciplinary research – which includes 
some, limited, social ‘element’ – the subterranean history of sociological 
attention to this question licensed the mobilization of sociological meth-
ods, histories, and concepts at the heart of the endeavour. Thus, at stake in 
this work is not the feeding in of sociological expertise into a neuroscien-
tific project as such, but rather a bringing of the neurosciences into those 
questions – conceptual and empirical – that are preoccupying sociologists 
and those in proximate fields. What we would call the sociological social 
was, then, built into this project from the outset.
During 2014 and 2015, the lab ran two interdisciplinary events in 
London, which (a) drew together a range of psychiatric, biological, 
sociological, and historical attention to this question; but also (b) drove 
such attention, simultaneously, through the shared co-design of a novel 
empirical project for locating urban mental illness as a phenomenon 
that is lived on the streets as much as it is experienced in the body. The 
design of that project is, as we write, ongoing; but we hope that it may 
ultimately become a space for foregrounding at least one kind of socio-
logical attention to the ‘environment’, and the pressure it exerts, in all its 
contest and complexity, through a nuanced and sophisticated attention to 
the embodiment of urban stress. It may show us, then, that even if we do 
sometimes encounter thin sociologies at the heart of avowedly interdisci-
plinary projects, there is no necessary relation between interdisciplinarity 
and vitiation. There are archives – historical and contemporary – that 
may yet help us to think and practise otherwise.
Notes & Queries: 3
Q: A lot of my geographical and anthropological research has been preoc-
cupied with socio-spatial configurations of different kinds of landscapes – 
both urban and rural. How might this be of interest to interdisciplinary 
researchers addressing the mind and brain?
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Or:
Q:  As a neuroscientist, I feel confident about how my field models genetic 
interactions, but it seems to me that accounts of social risk factors and life 
events are often much less robustly specified. Are there opportunities to 
work collaboratively across the disciplines on these questions?
A:  In response to both of you, we emphasize that there are many 
compelling points of intersection of the neural and the social that 
might draw you into interdisciplinary collaborations. Here are a 
few of the many arenas that we think would benefit from greater 
interdisciplinary attention.
 Working up the complex intersections between environment, trauma, 
and mental ill health/psychosis. There is a growing body of evidence 
that links traumatic and other kinds of adverse experiences to 
the development of psychosis and other forms of mental illness 
(Varese et al. 2012). Researchers of all stripes know, however, 
that acquiring robust assessments of traumatic experiences is a 
very difficult task. There are many rich models of trauma in all 
its heterogeneity within the social sciences and humanities that 
attend to trauma’s complex temporal structure, as well as the 
difficulties surrounding assessments of the veridicality of these 
experiences. How might these be threaded into clinical and 
epidemiological studies?
 Refining modelling of the environment in animal research. Many 
translational researchers have commented on the need for more 
ecologically valid models (particularly regarding the environ-
ment) in animal research (e.g. Nestler and Hyman 2010). Social 
scientists and historians of science and medicine have provided 
rigorous analyses of the assumptions and constraints built into 
models of the environment (Ankeny et al. 2014; Davies 2010; 
Ramsden 2011). How might these analyses be fed back into – and 
thereby refine – existing animal models?
 Improving models of stress as they entwine the physiological, the 
psychological, and the social. Neuroscientists know that there are 
multiple ways in which stress can affect brain function (e.g. 
Ganzel, Morris, and Wethington 2010). But while vulnerability 
factors have been extensively researched in relation to emotion, 
the relation between social behaviours and social brain function 
is far less well understood (Sandi and Haller 2015). In addition to 
large bodies of social scientific literature on how to conceptualize 
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and study social behaviours, there has been significant historical 
and sociological research on the heterogeneous concept of stress 
as it moves between the physiological, psychological, and social 
(Cantor and Ramsden 2014; Jackson 2013). How might these 
different bodies of research be better brought together?
 Contributing to theorizations of – and operationalizations of – 
‘human experience’ that work simultaneously with neurological and 
socio-cultural data to develop new theoretical models and new 
experimental paradigms. One good example is the Hearing the 
Voice project – which focuses on the experience of hearing a 
voice in the absence of any speaker (often referred to as auditory 
hallucinations in psychiatry). Researchers have been bringing 
together phenomenological and other kinds of material from 
the humanities into neuroscientific and psychological models of 
voice hearing (e.g. Woods et al. 2014).
 Addictions. Anthropologists and other social scientists have 
argued for the importance of understanding the complexities 
of milieu and of trajectories of addiction (Raikhel 2015). Daniel 
Lende – one of the main proponents of the field of neuroan-
thropology (Lende and Downey 2012) – has shown how such a 
project becomes possible by bringing together biological meas-
ures and ethnographic data (Lende 2005).
 Modelling race, culture, gender, and sexuality. There are many ways 
in which the insights of the humanities and interpretive social 
sciences might bear on current thin (if not problematic) ways 
of categorizing individual and social identity in neuroscientific 
studies. We have already mentioned Joel and colleagues’ work 
that pushes beyond existing psychological models of ‘core gender 
identity’ (Joel et al. 2014). Similarly, neuroscientific studies are 
beginning to add to and expand our accounts of how race oper-
ates and is mobilized as a social category (Kubota, Banaji, and 
Phelps 2012).
 Linking patterns of disorder or particular diagnoses to specific histo-
ries in particular areas. Sandro Galea’s research in Detroit demon-
strates how patterns of disorder or particular diagnoses can be 
traced to specific histories in particular areas (Galea 2011). How 
might historical sociologists and epidemiologists work together 
to develop other investigations into the entwinement of embod-
ied stress and political histories?
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 Poverty. Research attempting to model the subjective insults 
incurred through poverty so as to understand how the effects 
of poverty ‘get under the skin’ often turn to ethological models 
(e.g. by exploring the effects of status hierarchies; see Sapolsky 
2005). How might richer sociological, anthropological, and 
cultural-theoretical accounts – which attend to the complex 
ways in which poverty is produced and sustained – transform 
those models?
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